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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CoRpoRATE AcQUISrIoN op DisTRBuTvE FAcirirEs
Although nothing of consequence has developed in the general law
of corporations bearing on the right of one entity to acquire the distribution
facilities of another by the simple process of acquiring the stock or assets
of the second corporation, hardly a day goes by in which some corporation
lawyer is not faced with a question as to whether such an acquisition would
produce a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.' For that matter
officers of thriving manufacturing enterprises, desiring to expand, to
out-sell their competitors, to control more closely the process of distribution
of their products, and, ultimately, to earn more profits by a reduction of
expenses through volume sales, are also daily facing that question. But,
while a clear, definite answer as to the legality of such acquisitions would
remove much of the hesitancy and lend a degree of certainty to future
planning, there is no one answer for two conflicting schools of thought
exist over the question. One such school is represented by the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of St'andard Oil Compmny of
California v. United States,2 which opinion, together with the commentaries
of the advocates of its soundness, constitutes what may, for convenience,
be called the Standard Stations doctrine. In opposition thereto, is the
view more recently enunciated by the Federal Trade Commission in the
matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,3 which view has found support in certain
of the commentaries written thereon. The presence of these two views
invites a re-examination of the legal complexities likely to arise under
federal law in an area where state law would present no problems.
In that connection, it might be noted that the Standard Stations case
grew out of a suit brought by the United States under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act 4 to enjoin a major oil
1 15 U. S. C. § 18 declares, in part, that no "corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or tend to create a monopoly."
2337 U. S. 293, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 93 L. Ed. 1371 (1949), affirming 78 F. Supp. 850
(1948). Douglas, J., wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Jackson, J. Chief Justice
Vinson and Burton, J., concurred with Justice Jackson.
3 F. T. C. Docket 6000 (1953).
4 15 U. S. C. § 14 states that it "shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce ...to lease or make a sale or contract of sale of goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities .. . or fix a price charged
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company and its subsidiary from entering into or enforcing exclusive
supply contracts with independent dealers of petroleum products and
automobile accessories. The parent company was the largest seller of
gasoline in a seven-state market area5 and had operated under a system
of requirement contracts6 similar to those used by its major competitors.
The Justice Department argued that the facts were sufficient enough to
support a conclusion that the effect of these contracts, in the language of
Section 3, could be "to substantially lessen competition." By contrast,
the company claimed that, in actuality, the contracts had not lessened
competition, and it sought to offer evidence to show the general economic
picture within the industry. The trial court held that the need for showing
an actual or potential lessening of competition, i. e., a tendency to estab-
lish monopoly, had been adequately met by proof disclosing that the
contracts covered a substantial number of outlets and a substantial amount
of products, whether considered comparatively or not, so it granted the
declaratory relief sought.
When Standard appealed to the federal Supreme Court on the issue
as to whether or not the requirement of a showing that the arguments
could potentially "lessen competition" had been met simply by proof
that a substantial portion of that commerce was concerned, the court
answered in the affirmative, thereby upholding the decision of the lower
court. Holding this "quantative substantiality test" to be a proper one,
the majority of the court rejected the assertion that the government had
to demonstrate that competitive activity had actually diminished or prob-
ably would diminish, thereby indicating that the qualifying clause of
Section 3 would be satisfied by proof that competition had been foreclosed
in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected. Exclusion of
evidence as to economic factors was said to be proper on the basis the
same was immaterial for, admitting that control of distribution would be
likely to result in a lessening of costs and that the abandonment thereof
therefor... on the condition ... that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use
or deal in the goods ... of a competitor ... where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract of sale... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce."
5 In 1946, 23% of the total taxable gallonage sold in the market area was ac-
counted for by Standard Oil; with sales through company-owned service stations
constituting 6.8%, and sales under requirements contracts with independent service
stations constituting 6.7% of that total. The remainder was sold to industrial users.
Standard Oil and its six largest competitors sold 42.5% of all the gallonage in this
area.
6 Standard Oil had such contracts with 16% of all the retail outlets in the area.
Through them, the company sold nearly $58,000,000 worth of gasoline, and a little
over $8,200,000 worth of other products, of which tires and batteries never exceeded
2% of all sales in the area. During the ten-year period prior to 1946, Standard
Oil's proportionate sales of gasoline had remained at a stand-still but its sales of
lubricating oils had dropped from 6.2% to 5% of the total.
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could increase costs, under the interpretation given to Section 3, such a
consideration was not a proper one to be taken into account. For that
matter, the company's defenses that competition had actually increased,
that its sales had declined, and that its competitors were engaging in the
same type of activities, while regarded as important factors in an
economic analysis of the situation,7 were also said to have no bearing on
the legal implications.
It was in relation to those same legal implications that the majority
of the court placed great emphasis on the legislative history of Section 3.
Noting that that section had originally passed the House as a per se
prohibition, and that the qualifying "competitive impact" clause had
not been added until the bill reached the conference stage, the court
considered it significant that the "conferees responsible for adding that
language were at pains, in answering protestations that the qualifying
clause seriously weakened the section, to disclaim any intention seriously
to augment the burden of proof to be sustained in establishing violation
of it." It was also the view of the majority of the justices that it could
hardly seem likely that, "having on one hand set up an express pro-
hibition against a practice thought to be beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act, Congress meant, with the other hand, to re-establish the necessity of
meeting the same tests of detriment to the public interest as that Act had
been interpreted as requiring." Such being the case, to insist upon an
investigation of that type would be "to stultify the force of Congress'
declaration that requirements contracts are to be prohibited wherever their
effect 'may be' to substantially lessen competition."" In brief, therefore,
it seemed to be the majority view that Section 3 served, if not entirely,
then at least very nearly as a per se prohibition of exclusive dealing agree-
ments.
It should, in fairness, be said that the court recognized that if the
Clayton Act were to be administered solely by the Federal Trade Com-
mission there might be good reason for the establishment of a test of
violation which could take into consideration a myriad of economic factors
but, as violations of the statute could also be litigated in the federal court
system, a practical test had to be recognized. Justice Frankfurter ex-
pressed the thought by saying: "The dual system of enforcement provided
for the Clayton Act must have contemplated standards of proof capable
of administration by the courts as well as by the Federal Trade Commission
and other designated agencies ... Our interpretation of the Act, therefore,
T The court, in reaching its decision, did examine at least a part of the economic
picture, to-wit: the dominant industry position of the company in the market area.
8 337 U. S. 293 at 312-3, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 93 L. Ed. 1371 at 13856.
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should recognize that an appraisal of economic data which might be
practicable if only the latter were faced with the task might be quite
otherwise for judges unequipped for it either by experience or by the
availability of skilled assistance." 9
Those who advocate the application of the Standard Stations doctrine
to matters falling under Section 7 of the Clayton Act derive support from
two sources, to-wit: (1) the history of the application of unamended
Section 7, known to Congress, and (2) the legislative history of the
amendment to Section 7. The particular provision, 10 as framed at the
time of the original passage in 1914, had been inspired by a spread of
corporate mergers occurring at about the turn of the century and an
apparent inability on the part of the government, acting under the Sherman
Act,' to cope effectively with the problem. Its primary purpose, there-
fore, was to prohibit certain trade practices which were not covered by
the Sherman Act and also to arrest the creation of monopolies in their in-
ception and before their consummation. 12 However, the provision did not
accomplish as much as was hoped for and, prior to the 1950 amendment,
it had been an ineffective restraint on corporate mergers. One of the prin-
cipal factors for this ineffectiveness was the obliteration of a distinction
between standards of illegality under the two statutes. As a literal reading
of original Section 7 would have required the conclusion that every stock
acquisition between two competitors would be unlawful, the courts read
into the original section a test which looked to the effect of the acquisition
on competition in the industry as a whole, thereby requiring a showing
of prejudice to the public interest akin to the "rule-of-reason" test which
had obtained under the Sherman Act.
A leading example of this testimony may be found in the case of
International Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Commission'2 where it was
said that a mere "acquisition by one corporation of the stock of a com-
petitor, even though it results in some lessening of competition, is not
forbidden; the act deals only with such acquisitions as probably will result
in lessening competition to a substantial degree . . . that it to say
9 See footnote 13 at 337 U. S. 293 at 310, 69 S. Ct. 1051, 93 L. Ed. 1371 at 1384.
10 See Act of Oct. 15, 1914, c. 322, 38 Stat. 731. It declared: "No corporation
engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition
between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly of any line of commerce."
11 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890). The text thereof may be found in 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7.
12 See Sen. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1 (1914).
is 280 U. S. 291, 50 S. Ct. 89, 74 L. Ed. 431 (1930).
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to such a degree as will injuriously affect the public. "14 As subsequent
cases continued this interpretation, the "substantially lessen" phrase was
emptied of any intelligible significance apart from the meaning it possessed
under the Sherman Act.
With this experience in mind, Congress, by enacting the 1950 amend-
ment to Section 7, made it quite clear that the test of legality to be applied
to mergers under the Clayton Act was not the Sherman Act "rule-of-
reason" but rather a stricter and a more inclusive test.1 5  Those who
support the Standard Stations doctrine often cite, in support of their
advocacy, a House Committee Report on the amendment which states
that "a merger or acquisition will be unlawful if it may have the effect
of either (a) substantially lessening competition or (b) tending to create
a monopoly. These two tests of illegality are intended to be similar to
those which the courts have applied in interpreting the same language
in other sections of the Clayton Act. Thus, it would be unnecessary for
the Government to speculate as to what is in the 'back of the minds' of
those who promote a merger; or to prove that the acquiring firm had
engaged in actions which are considered to be unethical or predatory;
or to show that as a result of a merger the acquiring firm had already
obtained such a degree of control that it possessed the power to destroy
or exclude competitors or fix prices. "16
The reference therein to interpretations by the courts "of other
sections of the Clayton Act" is believed, by many, to indicate that the
House Committee had the Standard Stations case in mind when it drafted
this report for that case had been decided two months before publication
of the report, with the lower court decision antedating it by some fourteen
months.'7  The Senate Committee, by contrast, although referring to
the case in two places, states: "It is expected that, in the administration
of the act, full consideration will be given to all matters bearing upon
the maintenance of competition, including the circumstances giving rise
to the acquisition."' 8
If one is willing to grant that Congress had knowledge of the decision
at the time it amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the argument then
proceeds that Congress, by the use of language grammatically identical
14 280 U. S. 291 at 298, 50 S. Ct. 80, 74 L. Ed. 431 at 441.
15 Sen. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1950).
16 H. R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8 (1949).
17 Others, however, feel that the report was prepared prior to the release of the
Supreme Court opinion, so believe It in no way rests on, nor endorses, the views
of the court. See McLaren, "Related Problems of 'Requirements' Contracts and
Acquisitions in Vertical Integration," 45 I1. L. Rev. 141 (1950), particularly p. 171.
18 Sen. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8 (1950).
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to that found in Section 3, indicated a legislative intent to incorporate
the doctrine of the case into the new section for, if it contemplated or
desired a different test, then it is difficult to imagine why it did not choose
to express this intent in contrasting language. 19 One looking closely at
the 1950 amendment could well concede that its very words might show
an intention to include the "quantitative substantiality test" envisioned
in the Standard Stations doctrine. The new section is a prohibitory stat-
ute ; it makes unlawful an acquisition where "the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly,"
but it does not compel the judiciary to decide whether any given merger
is a "good" merger or a "bad" merger, i. e., one for or against the public
interest. Instead, it superficially purports to strike at any merger where
the effect thereof would be to destroy competition in a substantial portion
of the market.20
A different approach to the subject is disclosed in the matter entitled
Pillsbury Mills, Inc., where the Federal Trade Commission had occasion
to consider at length the intent and scope of amended Section .7. The
matter came before the Commission on an appeal from a trial examiner's
report directing the dismissal of a complaint challenging the acquisition
by Pillsbury Mills of the assets of two of its competitors. The Commission,
having first determined the market area involved, undertook a consider-
ation of the effect of these mergers on the sales of Pillsbury and on the
share of the market occupied by the merged corporation 2' and found that
Pillsbury, in the area, had gone from fifth place to second with respect to
family flour; from third place to first as to bakery flour; and had retained
its first place position as to mixes. Mill capacity and sales on a nationwide
basis were also considered.22  The Commission then concluded that, unless
19 Schwartz, "Potential Impairment of Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil
Co. of Calfornia v. United States on the Standard of Legality under the Clayton
Act," 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 10 (1949).
20 It should be noted, before leaving the direct discussion of the more strict test
of the legality of corporate mergers, that Congress has clearly indicated that the
Section 7 test, whether it be the strict one or one less strict, is to be applied to
small acquisitions as well as to larger ones, particularly so when small acquisitions
are shown to be a part of a pattern of acquisitions: H. R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 8 (1949) ; Sen. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5 (1950) ; and
"The Merger Movement, A Summary Report," Federal Trade Commission, pp. 6-7
(1948).
21 The area covered the Southeast United States in which Pillsbury's sales of
bakery flour had increased 40%, its sales of mixes had increased 78%, its sales of
family flour had increased 154%, and Its sales of feed had gone from 20,000 tons to
175,000 tons per year.
22 It appeared, from the opinion of the Commission, that Pillsbury had acquired
nine mills, elevators, and similar facilities over the course of the prior ten years,
causing the Commission to lay particular emphasis on the declining number of mills
and the declining mill capacity, particularly in the market area where there was a
comparative lack of competition In urban locations. Claims by Pillsbury that the
evidence disclosed the presence of a large number of small competitors was offset,
to some extent, by the fact these competitors were concentrated in rural areas.
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these facts were rebutted, there appeared to be sufficient evidence to estab-
lish that competition in the urban centers of the market area had undergone
a considerable change, leading to a fear that the trend, if continued, would
lead to oligopolistic competition which, while perhaps not forbidden by
the Sherman Act, was of the type which Congress intended to condemn
and desired to halt when it enacted the 1950 amendment to Section 7.
When it turned to an examination of the legal aspects of the Pillsbury
acquisitions, however, the Commission rejected a proposal that it should
apply the Standard Stations doctrine to a case based on Section 7, saying
that much "as the simplified test laid down in Standard Stations and
International Salt may aid in the presentation of proof in cases under
Section 3, it is not in itself a reliable guide for the Commission in carrying
out its long-run responsibility to prevent reductions in competition through
acquisitions. " 23 It similarly rejected the "rule-of-reason" test of the
Sherman Act, conceiving that Section 7 differed from the Sherman Act
to the extent that a violation of the former could be established by a lower
standard of proof even in relation to the same kind of acts as would be
prohibited by the Sherman Act itself. In that connection, Chairman
Howrey expressed the view that amended Section 7 "sought to reach the
mergers embraced within its sphere in their incipiency, and to determine
their legality by tests of its own. These are not the rule of reason of
the Sherman Act, that is, unreasonable restraint of trade, nor are Section
7 prohibitions to be added to the list of per se violations. Somewhere in
between is Section 7, which prohibits acts that 'may' happen to a particu-
lar market, that looks to a 'reasonable probability,' to 'substantial' economic
consequences, to acts that 'tend' to a result. Overall is the broad purpose
to supplement the Sherman Act and to reach incipient restraints. "
24
Critics of the doctrine so enunciated by Chairman Howrey question
its "somewhere in between" position. They believe that the doctrine is
a "rule-of-reason" approach if not a "rule-of-reason" test,2 5 but the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
approved the test so propounded and urged that Section 7, as amended,
28 F. T. C. Docket 6000, pp. 8-9 (1953).
24 Ibid., p. 13. The Commission relied heavily on the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F. (2d) 163 (1953), cert.
den. 346 U. S. 901, 74 S. Ct. 225, 98 L. Ed. 401 (1953). It should be noted that while
this was a Section 7 case and was decided in 1953, it was based on the section as It
stood prior to the 1950 amendment so it must be supposed the court did not give
consideration to the legislative history of the amendment when it drew its con-
clusions.
25 In support of this criticism, those opposing the doctrine point to a remark by
Chairman Howrey to the effect that, at the Federal Trade Commission, "I am glad
to say, we have moved in the direction of a rule of reason approach In our recent
decisional work." See paper entitled "Coalescence of Legal and Economic Concepts
of Competition," In CCH Antitrust Law Symposium (1955), pp. 5-6.
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calls for a detailed analysis of all relevant economic factors. For that
reason, the committee expressly rejected' the "quantitative substantiality
test" of the Standard Stations case.
26
Until the law becomes clear on the point, the question is really one as
to whether or not the conflicting doctrines of the Standard Stations and
the Pillsbury Mills cases can or should be reconciled. A middle ground
might be achieved without doing violence to either doctrine by the enact-
ment of further legislation which could take into consideration the valid
policy considerations of both. Such a law might require that a respond-
ent's economic evidence be considered by the trial court or the trial
examiner and that findings be based thereon. But, once it had been
established that a given acquisition had affected a substantial share of
the market, the risk of non-persuasion could be placed upon the respond-
ent to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the acquisition had
not tended to lessen competition nor served to create a monopoly.2 7 By
making this allocation of the burdens between the parties, some of the
objections to a full consideration of economic data that have been raised
by proponents of the Standard Stations doctrine would be answered.
The petitioner would not be required to supply conclusive proof that the
acquisition had actually reduced competition below the level which it
would otherwise have reached or maintained, nor would the court be
required to make a nice evaluation as to the preponderance of evidence
with respect to the respondent's affirmative defense. True, the court would
have to deal with technical economic data, but it need not find for respond-
ent unless it had been clearly convinced as to the merit of the defense
presented so, unless the respondent had decisively made out this affirmative
defense, the court would be justified in finding for the petitioner.
This formula, of course, would satisfy neither the adherents of the
Standard Stations doctrine nor the proponents of the Pillsbury Mills view;
the former would, without doubt, object to a federal court giving con-
sideration to complex economic factors, and the latter would object to
the placing of the burden of proof on the respondent. But some middle
point must be achieved for the alternatives are either a proscription against
all acquisitions or an ineffective and unenforcible antitrust law.
J. J. RYAN
26 Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
(1955), p. 123.
27 Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy," 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1139 (1952). See also note in 63 Yale L. J. 233,
where the writer, at p. 239, suggests that such a formula would "combine the
judicial insights embodied in the Sherman Act rule-of-reason" with the Standard
Stations doctrine.
